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LAY JUDGES
Due Process and Lay Judges
Is it a denial of due process for a defendant in a criminal trial, facing
a possible jail sentence, to have his trial presided over by a non-lawyer
judge, i.e., a lay judge? This question was answered by the Supreme
Court of California in Gordon v. Justice Court of Yuba City, Sutter
County.' The competency of one not an attorney to hold the office
of judge has been challenged many times in the past. The few cases
that have met the challenge based on a due process argument have held
that it is not a denial of due process to be tried by a non-attorney judge.2
The Supreme Court of California held in Gordon that this practice does
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, and that henceforth defendants in such
courts are entitled to have an attorney judge preside over all criminal
proceedings involving charges which carry a possibility of a jail sen-
tence, unless such right is waived by the defendant or his counsel. 3
In Gordon, the defendants were accused of misdemeanor crimes.
Gordon was brought before a non-attorney judge in the Yuba City Jus-
tice Court for disturbing the peace and failing to disperse. Arguijo was
brought before a non-attorney judge of the Grover City Justice Court
for driving under the influence of alcohol. Motions were made by both
defendants to disqualify the judges on the grounds of lack of qualifica-
tion. The motions were denied.
Suit was then filed as a class by petitioners in behalf of themselves
and others similarly situated, against the respondent courts and judges
thereof and all other justice courts and their judges similarly situated,
i.e., having and being non-lawyers judges.4  Petitioners claimed that
any non-lawyer judge presiding over their trial would be a denial of
due process.
Petitioners based their claims on the constitutional right of every de-
fendant to a fair trial. Their contention was that it is a violation of
due process to be tried before a lay judge because his inadequate train-
ing does not permit him to grasp complex constitutional issues. It was
further argued that he is more susceptible to advice from law enforce-
ment people, is unable to educate himself due to an inadequate law
library, and is more apt to be swayed by his own personal prejudices
1. 12 Cal. 3d 323, 525 P.2d 72, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1974).
2. Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W.2d 772 (Ky., 1973); Crouch v. Justice of Peace
Court of the Sixth Precinct, 440 P.2d 1000, 7 Ariz. App. 460 (1968); Melikian v. Avent,
300 F. Supp. 516 (D.C.N.D. Miss. 1969).
3. 12 Cal. 3d at 324, 525 P.2d at 73, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 633.
4. Gordon v. Justice Court of Yuba City, Sutter County, 33 Cal. App. 3d 230, 235,
108 Cal. Rptr. 912, 917 (1973).
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as well as local pressure.5 Many examples were presented in the plain-
tiffs petition of non-lawyer judges' misconduct in handling cases. The
petitioner contended that since the United States Supreme Court has
guaranteed them a right to counsel6 this implies a right to a trial by
an attorney judge.
The California Court of Appeals in upholding a trial court decision
that this was not a denial of due process stated:
We affirm the conclusions of the trial court that the use of non-lawyer
justice courts, as provided by the Legislature under the permission of
the state constitution conforms to procedural due process; and that the
use of non-attorney judges does not offend some principle of justice
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental. 7
The appellate court felt that if the requirements for a judge were to
be changed it should be done by the state legislature.
The Supreme Court of California said the test to use to determine
in advance of trial whether a particular proceeding or procedure com-
ports with the demands of due process is whether in the absence of
relief a reasonable likelihood exists that a fair trial cannot be had.s
"Reasonable likelihood of prejudice does not mean that prejudice must
be 'more probable than not', a defendant is entitled to relief when he
has shown a reasonable likelihood that he will not receive a fair trial."9
The court thought that the reasonable likelihood of the petitioners re-
ceiving a fair trial would be substantially reduced because of the ina-
ability of the judges, due to inadequate training, to comprehend the
constitutional and procedural issues of the criminal trials.
The court concluded by saying the defendants' right of appeal from
a lay judge court cannot satisfy the due process requirement of a fair
trial as argued by respondent. An appeal is an inadequate remedy due
to the expense, delay and burden on the defendant.10 "Since our legal
system regards denial of counsel as a denial of fundamental fairness,
it logically follows that the failure to provide a judge qualified to com-
prehend and utilize counsel's legal arguments likewise must be con-
sidered a denial of due process.""
5. Id.
6. Argensinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963).
7. Gordon v. Justice Court of Yuba City, Sutter County, 33 Cal. App. 3d 230, 244,
108 Cal. Rptr. 912, 926 (1973).
8. 12 Cal. 2d at 326, 525 P.2d at 75, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 635 (1974).
9. Frazier v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 287, 486 P.2d 694, 95 Cal. Rptr. 798
(1971).
10. Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 212 P.2d 878 (1949).
11. 12 Cal. 3d 329, 525 P.2d at 78, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 638 (1974).
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The competency of non-lawyer judges is a long-running debate. In
the early part of the fourteenth century King Edward III created the
justice-of-the-peace system. The system has continued in England un-
til today and the early British colonists brought the system to Amer-
ica. 2 The system has served a very useful purpose in this country.
In the early part of our history there were few lawyers and the laws
were simple. In addition, because of slow transportation between the
communities spread out across the thinly populated states, it was im-
practical and almost impossible for the few attorney judges to travel to
rural areas.
The issue of whether a judge had to be an attorney was decided as
early as 1890 in Little v. State" when the court held that the State Con-
stitution of Texas did not require one to be an attorney. The system
has been under heavy attack for several decades in this country. Con-
stitutional questions have been raised against the lack of judicial quali-
fications of the justices and the fee system of compensation.
Traditionally, defendants charged with misdemeanors were tried in
justice of the peace courts in which a justice collected his fee only upon
a defendant's conviction. 14 This was declared unconstitutional by the
United States Supreme Court in Tumey v. Ohio in 1927.1" Tumey was
convicted in a major's court of unlawful possession of liquor, a mis-
demeanor. If he had not been convicted, the justice would not have
received any compensation. The Court said the pecuniary interest fac-
tor alone constituted a fatal denial of due process of law.' 6 The Tumey
decision has been narrowly construed by most state courts who normally
hold that where a defendant had a right to a jury trial or a trial de novo
on appeal to a higher court, procedural due process requirements are
satisfied. 17 Although courts have not held it a denial of due process
where a lay judge presides over a trial, courts have held it a violation
of due process when justices are paid a salary out of a fund consisting
of fines collected.' 8
In recent years the strongest criticism of lay judges has been because
of an inadequate legal education background to handle the complex
constitutional and procedural questions. Stark'9 raised two constitu-
12. Smith, The Justice of the Peace System in the United States, 15 CALIF. L. REV.
118 (1926-27) [hereinafter cited as Smith].
13. Little v. State, 75 Tex. 616, 12 S.W. 965 (1890).
14. Stark, Constitutional Challenge to the Justice of the Peace Court in Mississippi,
44 Miss. L. Jout. 996, 1000 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Stark].
15. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
16. Stark, at 1001.
17. Id.
18. State v. Chinn, 146 W. Va. 610, 121 S.E.2d 610 (1961).
19. Stark, at 1005.
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tional questions: (1) Is a defendant guaranteed "due process" in a
court where the judge is ignorant of judicial procedure? (2) Are the
requirements of due process satisfied by a trial de novo in circuit court
on appeal?
There are two schools of thought about the necessity of legal training
for judges. One theory is that the judge cannot be competent unless
he is licensed to practice law. This position considers legal training
to be the base upon which sound legal judgments are built and which
contends that the public image of justice courts can only be improved
if and when lawyers sit as justices of the peace as they do at all other
levels of the court system.20
The opposing theory is that the application of common sense to legal
questions should be at the heart of the justice court system and that
the acquisition of such an attribute does not depend upon a law degree.
This approach is acceptable only when the justice has sufficient knowl-
edge of the law to temper the harshness of the law with equity and
common sense.- A lack of legal training for judges has come under
attack in many states and has resulted in statutory changes in the court
system in many states.
As a sovereign power, the state can create, organize and control its
own judiciary. As a general rule, the legislature may determine the
manner or method of selecting judges of inferior courts and, accord-
ingly, it may provide for the election of such judges by the people or
for the selection of such judges by superior judges or by local officials.22
In the absence of constitutional or statutory provisions requiring it, it
is not necessary that a judge shall be a licensed attorney at law; and
the legislature cannot enforce such qualifications where it conflicts with
constitutional provisions. Some constitutional and statutory provisions,
however, require that a person be admitted to the bar to be eligible
to be a judge in certain courts.23  The state legislature may be given
the power to change its court system by the state constitution. If this
power is reserved in the constitution or the constitution permits non-
attorney judges then it may require a constitutional amendment to re-
lease this power to the legislature. 24
In 1915 the constitutions of 47 of the 48 states had mentioned the
justice of the peace as a judicial officer and the constitutions of 28 of
the states included him in the list of named courts vested with judicial
20. Holden, Justice Court Reform in Montana, 34 MoNT. L. REv. 122, 133 (1973).
21. Id.
22. 48 C.J.S. Judges § 13 (1947).
23. Id. § 14.
24. Smith, at 137.
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power. 25  Most states today require a judge to be an attorney. Al-
though the states are steadily abolishing the office of justice of the
peace or severely reducing the justices' power, many states still permit
lay judges to serve on the bench. Each state sets its own qualifications
for judges. Some states require attorney judges in heavily populated
districts but do not require attorney judges in the districts with small
populations. Many of the states require a lay judge to pass a qualify-
ing examination or take training courses or attend schools or some com-
binations of all of these.
In 1961 North Carolina revised the Judicial Article of the North Car-
olina Constitution26 and abolished the justice of the peace court and
created a district court system staffed by magistrates and judges.
These judges are not required to be attorneys nor take any type of qual-
ifying examinations. At present there are 10 lay judges serving on the
district court bench. The background of these 10 judges include po-
liceman, clerk of court, recorder's court juryman, former state legislator,
personnel manager, and highway patrolman." Magistrates are rele-
gated the duty of settling small claims, issuing warrants, setting bail,
and accepting guilty pleas in minor traffic and misdemeanor cases.
The State of Washington in 1961 passed the District Justice Court
Act, which was mandatory in the three largest counties and optional
in other counties. Each district of a county with 20,000 or more pop-
ulation was required to have a full time judge. In districts of less than
10,000 persons an individual who is not an attorney or a "grand-
father"2" may take an examination and, if he qualifies, may file for the
position of justice of the peace or district judge.29
On January 1, 1964, Michigan's new constitution of 1963 became
effective.3 ° The constitution declared that to hold the office of justice
or judge in a court of record one had to be licensed to practice law
in the state.3 '
In California each county is divided into municipal court and justice
court districts with districts of more than 40,000 residents having a mu-
nicipal court and those of 40,000 or less having a justice court.32
Justice courts have jurisdiction over various civil matters and criminal
misdemeanors punishable by a fine of $1,000 or less or a maximum
25. Hennessey, Qualification of California Justice Court Judges; A Dual System, 3
PAC. L.J. 439, 465 (1972). [hereinafter cited as Hennessey].
26. N.C. CONST. art. 4, § 8.
27. Raleigh News and Observer, Jan. 13, 1975, at 1, Col. 1.
28. A person who was a lay judge at the time the act came into effect.
29. Hennessey, at 466.
30. MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 19.
31. Hennessey, at 469.
32. Id.
5
Pierce: Due Process and Lay Judges
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1975
344 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
term of one year in a county jail or both.3 The qualifications of jus-
tice court judges set by the California State Legislature are that a candi-
date must (1) be a member of the state bar or (2) have passed a quali-
fying examination prescribed by the Judicial Council or (3) have been
an incumbent in a justice court or a predecessor court at the time that
the Reorganization Act of 1950 became inoperative and have retained
that position continuously. 4 In light of the Gordon decision these stat-
utory requirements will have to be modified to avoid a denial of due
process.3 5
These changes in the court system suggest a trend toward using the
lay judges as commissioners and magistrates to handle small claims, set
bail, issue warrants and accept guilty pleas in minor traffic violations.
Courts that still use lay judges are beginning to require more training
to improve their qualifications.
In the past, state courts have consistently held that, unless required
by the state constitution or by state statute, that one does not have to
be an attorney to be a judge.3 6 Most states require that a judge be
a practicing attorney or member of the state bar3 7 or engaged in the
practice of law for a certain number of years.38 If a judge is required
by statute to be an attorney at law, it is clear that he must necessarily
maintain his privilege to practice law, i.e., his membership in the legal
profession. It follows that an indefinite suspension from the practice
of law works a forfeiture of the office of municipal judge and is grounds
for removal.3 9  A disbarred attorney is no more qualified to hold the
office of justice of the supreme court or judge of the district court than
any other lay person. By his disbarment, he is reduced to the status
of a layman."
The only split of authority in interpreting these cases is the inter-
pretation of the constitutional requirement of being "learned in the
33. Gordon v. Justice Court of Yuba City, Sutter County 12 Cal. 3d 323, 325, 525
P.2d 72, 74, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632, 634 (1974).
34. Id.
35. Bills were introduced in the 1967 and 1971 California Legislature in an attempt
to upgrade and change the California Court System. Either bill, if passed, would have
permitted any lay judges to serve in some districts of the state.
36. State ex rel. Swann v. Freshour, 219 Tenn. 492, 410 S.W.2d 885 (1967); State
v. Peck, 88 Conn. 447, 91 A. 274 (1914); Waggoner v. Castleman, 492 S.W.2d 929
(Ky., 1973).
37. Wills v. Monfort, 93 Wash. 4, 159 P. 889 (1916); Veterans Welfare Board v.
Riley, 189 Cal. 159, 208 P. 678 (1922); In re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602, 214 N.W. 379
(1927). Annot., 55 A.L.R. 1355 (1929).
38. In re Storace, 291 N.Y.S.2d 416, 30 A.D.2d 220 (1968). Annot., 106 A.L.R.
508 (1937).
39. State ex rel. Saxbe v. Franko, 168 Ohio St. 338, 154 S.E.2d 751 (1958).
40. In re Candidacy of Jerome Daly and Gordon C. Peterson for associate Justice
of the Supreme Court, and the Candidacy of William E. Drexler and Charles Thibodeau
for Judge of District Court. 294 Minn. Rpts. 351, 200 N.W,2d 913 (1972).
6
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law."'" Some courts hold that the words "learned in the law" were
intended as a direction to the voters. The legislators could have used
the words "licensed attorney" if that is what they meant. 42  The op-
posing theory is that the phrase was inserted for a purpose, that it
clearly indicates an intention to prescribe some sort of an educational
qualification and should be given some practical effect. Under this
theory one must be a practicing attorney or entitled to practice without
examination when elected as judge.4"
The denial of due process because of a lay judge presiding over the
trial has been raised as an issue in Ditty v. Hampton, Crouch v. Justice
of the Peace Court, Sixth Precinct, and Milikian v. Avent. The federal
judge rejected the due process argument in Melikan and stated that
"any prejudice to which plaintiff might have been subjected . . . is
cured and due process is obtained by the right to a jury trial." In Ditty,
the Appellate Court of Kentucky reversed the Harlan Circuit Court
which held it was a denial of due process for a judge in a criminal prose-
cution, whether for a felony or a misdemeanor and whether punishable
by a fine, to not be a person learned and trained in the law.4 5 The
Harlan Circuit Court decided that since Argersinger v. Hamlin" held
that due process requires that the accused in a criminal case be repre-
sented by legal counsel when imprisonment is possible, then it neces-
sarily follows that due process requires that the court in such a case
be presided over by a lawyer.
The Supreme Court in Gordon agreed with this rationale, but the
appellate court in Ditty disagreed with it and set forth a string of United
States Supreme Court decisions dealing with defendant's right of an
attorney and pointed out that no right to a trial by an attorney judge
was recognized by the court. In Gideon v. Wainwright47 the right to
have counsel in felony prosecutions in all state courts was recognized.
Thereafter, at least as soon as Duncan v. Louisiana,4 it became ac-
cepted that the right to counsel existed in prosecutions for serious mis-
demeanors. In 1962, in White v. Maryland49 it was held that an
accused is entitled to counsel at the examining trial. In 1966, In re
Gault5" held that a juvenile was entitled to counsel in proceedings in
41. Annot., 50A.L.R. 1156 (1928).
42. Little v. State, 75 Tex. 620, 12 S.W. 965 (1890); Heard v. Moore, 154 Tenn.
566, 290 S.W. 15 (1926). Annot., 50 A.L.R. 1152 (1928).
43. State ex rel. Jack v. Schmahl, 125 Minn. 533, 147 N.W. 425 (1914); Jamieson
v. Wiggins, 12 S.W. 16, 80 N.W. 137 (1888).
44. 300 F. Supp. at 518-19.
45. 490 S.W.2d at 774.
46. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
47. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
48. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
39. 373 U.S. 59 (1962).
50. 387 U.S. 1 (1966).
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juvenile court. Never, on the occasion of any of these decisions, was
it even suggested that the right to counsel carries with it the right to
be tried by an attorney judge. 51
In Ditty, the court defined due process as embodying those "funda-
mental principles of liberty and justice which lies at the base of our
civil and political institutions." 2 The court further concluded that due
process only meant that the judge had to be fair and impartial and that
the reason for the accused having counsel was because of the adver-
sary system. Since the judge is not one of the adversaries, he does
not have to be an attorney judge. Traditional concepts of fundamental
fairness do not require an accused to be tried by an attorney judge.
In the event of a mistake the right of appeal will correct any error which
might have been made.
In Crouch, 3 the question was raised as to whether it was a denial
of due process for a lay judge to give instructions to a jury in a criminal
misdemeanor case. The Appellate Court of Arizona held that it was
the expressed intent of the State Legislature that a justice of the peace
is not required to be an attorney, that a justice court has jurisdiction
in criminal misdemeanor matters, and that a justice of the peace has
the power to instruct a jury as to the law in a criminal misdemeanor
proceeding and that this does not deny a misdemeanant due process
of law. The court said there is no more nebulous and indefinable con-
cept in law than "due process of law." The fact that a judicial error
may be made in a proceeding does not necessarily imply denial of due
process.
The Crouch decision held that a lay judge presiding over a criminal
misdemeanor tribunal was not a denial of "fundamental fairness shock-
ing to the universal sense of justice" nor does it "offend some principle
of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental." 4  The court relied on a United States
Supreme Court case that held:
a state is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance
with its own conception of policy and fairness unless, in so doing, it
offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and cons-
cience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. Its procedure
does not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment because another
51. By examining these cases the court in Ditty rationalized that since the United
States Supreme Court had not on its own recognized the right to have these cases tried
before an attorney judge that no such right existed. Little weight can be placed on this
rationalization due to the Supreme Court's policy of only answering the questions pre-
sented to the Court in a narrow sense.
52. 490 S.W.2d at 774.
53. 7 Ariz. App. at 465, 440 P.2d at 1005.
54. 7 Ariz. App. at 466, 440 P.2d at 1006.
8
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method may seem to our thinking to be fairer or wiser or to give a
surer promise of protection ,to the prisoner at bar. 5
In Argersinger, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the
legal and constitutional issues in a misdemeanor case may be as com-
plex as the issues in a serious offense. In Gordon, the Supreme Court
of California expressed concern that the background of a non-attorney
judge would not be sufficient to reorganize and resolve these issues
pursuant to the law. The court felt the examination that the lay judges
were required to pass was not sufficient to ascertain whether the judge
had adequate knowledge to make the correct decisions. The court
pointed out that even if the non-attorney judge would recognize the
relevant first amendment issues, he probably would have difficulty
determining whether Gordon had engaged in protected activity., The
non-attorney judge is required to rule on procedural matters and on the
admissibility of evidence. He is required to conduct preliminary hear-
ings and to set bail. He is expected to make an "objective" determina-
tion of "probable cause" when he issues search warrants and arrest war-
rants; he is not supposed to serve as a rubber stamp for the police. And
when he conducts a trial, he is expected to instruct the jury in the law. 7
Given all these responsibilities, a judge with more than an adequate
background of formal legal training and practical experience at times
will make a mistake. But is it not the object of our court system to
afford the accused a trial that is as fair, impartial and competent as pos-
sible? Can this be done by using lay judges? The court in Ditty and
Crouch and the appellate court in Gordon thought that it could be done.
They held that the due process clause does not insure against judicial
errors. The judge satisfies due process when he is fair and impartial.
The fact he may commit error, be he a lawyer or non-lawyer, does
not negate these qualities.
The Gordon court maintained that the conditions which forced the
creation of our non-attorney judge system in the United States have
since ceased to exist. We live in a complex industrial and commercial
age which has developed a highly technical and specialized body of le-
gal concepts. The court held that long-standing practices must meet
the advancing standards of due process. The court quoted the Wolf
v. Colorado5" decision which stated:
Due process of law thus conveys neither formal nor fixed non-narrow
requirements. It is the compendious expression for all those rights
which the court must enforce because they are basic to our free so-
ciety. But basic rights do not become petrified as if any one time,
55. Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
56. 12 Cal. 3d at 328, 525 P.2d at 77, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
57. Stark, at 1005.
58. 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
347
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even though, as a matter of human experience, some may not too
rhetorically be called eternal verities. It is of the very nature of a
free society to advance in standards of what is deemed reasonable and
right . ..
The court in Ditty recognized the Wolf v. Colorado decision but held
that due process was those "fundamental principles of liberty and jus-
tice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions." One
test we apply to determine whether due process has been accorded in
a given instance is to ascertain that were "the settled usages and modes
of proceedings under the common and statutory law of England before
the Declaration of Independence . .. having been followed in this
country after it became a nation." 59
The Ditty court maintained that advancing standards or changing
conditions have not yet made the attorney judge a condition of funda-
mental fairness and that traditional concepts of fundamental fairness do
not require that an -accused be tried by an attorney judge. The Gordon
court held that allowing a layman to be judge in a criminal proceeding
must be scrutinized in the light of modern standards and conditions.
The increased complexity of a criminal tribunal has greatly enhanced
the probability that a layman will be unable to deal effectively with the
complexities inherent in a criminal trial.60
The court in Crouch did not deal directly with the due process issue
but said that this is not a denial of due process, because, traditionally,
justice has been served by lay judges. The Melikian court thought the
issue was unique and of no merit. It appears that only in the Ditty
court did the judges give the issue of denial of due process any serious
thought.
The Gordon court felt that neither the Ditty nor the Melikian court
adequately explained the inconsistency of allowing a defendant an at-
torney and not providing an attorney judge to preside over the trial.
The court decided that if fundamental fairness required a counsel that it
logically required someone who could understand the counsel's techni-
cal arguments.61 The Ditty court had decided that the right to appeal
was a sufficient guarantee of due process. The Gordon court was
against this argument because of the inconvenience to the defendant and
because there is usually no record made of a non-attorney judges' court.
CONCLUSION
The Gordon holding is contra to the long line of cases that have held
that where the state constitution or state statute does not require that
59. 490 S.W.2d at 774.
60. 12 Cal. 3d at 326, 525 P.2d at 75, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 635 (1974).
61. 12 Cal. 3d at 329, 525 P.2d at 78, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
10
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to be an attorney one must be a judge, then he does not have to be.
The effect of this decision will be to change the Justice Court System
in California. Henceforth, all criminal tribunals where there is a poten-
tial jail sentence, will have to be presided over by an attorney judge.
This decision does not affect the lay judge in deciding civil cases or
in criminal cases where there is not a possibility of a jail sentence. The
decision does permit a defendant or his counsel to waive the require-
ment of an attorney judge. To meet these requirements, the California
court system will have to be changed to docket the criminal cases that
this decision covers under attorney judges. New attorney judges may
have to be elected to meet this demand.
The most distinguishing characteristic of the Gordon case is that the
court has decided that time and the perplexity of criminal trials have
changed the requirements of due process in criminal trials. The com-
plexity of criminal trials today requires a judge to be able to understand
and differentiate among the fine points of law which may distinguish
one case from another. The ability to make this determination comes
from a combination of common sense and formal legal training.
Due process requires more than common sense determinations of le-
gal questions. Due process requires a judgment pursuant to the law.
A common sense judgment that is not pursuant to the law is arbitrary
and violates due process. Some non-attorney judges through personal
research and learning may acquire the expertise necessary to conduct
a trial that meets constitutional requirements. However, there should
be some safeguard against non-attorneys without these capabilities.
This can be done only by requiring judges to meet higher standards
as the court has done here. This court has taken a positive step for-
ward in refining the law and assuring the accused that, in the future,
he will receive a fair, impartial and competent trial from a tribunal that
is in step with the requirements of modern day due process.
JULIAN T. PIERCE
Photographic Evidence: or, Is a Picture Really Worth a Thousand
Words in North Carolina Courtrooms?
A recent case handed down by the North Carolina Supreme Court
may have a profound impact on the law governing admissability of
photographs for other than illustrative evidence. In State v. Foster',
I. State v. Foster, 284 N.C. 259, 200 S.E.2d 782 (1973).
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